Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of International Climate Agreements by Nagashima, Miyuki
Osaka University
Title Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design ofInternational Climate Agreements
Author(s)Nagashima, Miyuki
Citation国際公共政策研究. 16(1) P.125-P.134
Issue Date2011-09
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23043
DOI
Rights
???
Insights from Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Design of 
International Climate Agreements*
Miyuki NAGASHIMA????
Abstract
Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine interactions between countries in 
the negotiations on climate change, and have emphasized difficulties in designing such a voluntary 
agreement. This paper presents the current status of international negotiation on climate change control 
and the observed scientifi c evidence, and provides an overview of literature on game-theoretic analysis 
of climate coalition formation. The role of some fl exible mechanisms and potential extensions will be 
discussed to promote participation in the international agreement on climate change.
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1. Introduction
Global warming has been considered one of the major environmental challenges that the world is facing 
to date. International cooperation is vital to achieve a large amount of reductions of the greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) emissions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into 
force in 1994 with an aim to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed, which mandated that by the period from 2008 to 2012, Annex I countries (composed of 
developed countries and economies in transition) should reduce their GHGs emissions by approximately 5% 
compared to their 1990 levels. The Protocol came into force in 2005, although the U.S.A., one of the major 
emitters of CO2, had not ratifi ed the Protocol. Upon the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties to the 
UNFCCC continue to strive to negotiate on the post-Kyoto international framework. The negotiation at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen revealed how diffi cult it was to achieve full 
cooperation on climate change control. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental scientifi c body, states in 
its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) that ‘Warming of the climate system is unequivocal’ by quoting the ob-
servation of changes in the climate system, such as rise in the global average surface temperature and global 
average sea level (IPCC, 2007a). The global average surface temperature has increased by about 0.74±0.18 
˚C over the period 1906 to 2005, and global average sea level has risen by 3.1±0.7 mm per year from 1993 to 
2003 (IPCC, 2007a). Furthermore, AR4 shows that precipitation increased considerably over the period from 
1900 to 2005 in eastern parts of North and South America, northern Europe and northern and central Asia, 
while it declined in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia. There is associ-
ated observable evidence of extreme climate events, such as tropical cyclones and increase in the frequency 
of hot days and heat waves (IPCC, 2007a). The main cause of global warming is considered to be greenhouse 
gas forcing over the last 50 years and it is ‘very likely’ that human activities, such as burning of fossil fuels, 
signifi cantly contributed to the rise in temperature over the last 50 years (IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007a). In the 
absence of additional climate policy, the baseline global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 1) are pro-
jected to increase by values in the range between 9.7 Gigaton of carbon dioxide-equivalent (GtCO2-eq) and 
36.7 GtCO2-eq (25% - 90%) between 2000 and 2030 (IPCC, 2000; IPCC, 2007b). Especially, the fossil fuel 
originated CO2 emissions are projected to grow by any rate between 40% and 110% from 2000 to 2030 (IPCC, 
2007b). 
 1) Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Sulfur hexafl uoride (SF6), Hydrofl uorocarbons (HFCs) and Perfl uorocarbons 
(PFCs) are the greenhouse gases listed in Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1998).
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Controlling CO2 emission encompasses the characteristics of a public good?
 2) Benefi ts derived from abate-
ment by one region are freely available to other countries (non-excludability) and the benefi ts enjoyed by one 
region do not diminish the benefi ts that other countries may obtain (non-rivalry). These features give rise to a 
free-riding problem, a situation in which regions have few incentives to contribute to the protection of global 
commons, while they can enjoy benefi ts derived from abatement efforts by others. It has been widely ac-
knowledged that cooperation on abatement is likely to be diffi cult to achieve, because of the existence of free-
riding. The main obstacle to an implementation of a successful agreement is that the agreement must be rati-
fi ed on a voluntary basis. There are no international institutions and international laws that implement binding 
International Climate Agreements (ICAs) for all countries involved. Thus, we have to rely on individual vol-
untary participation in an ICA. It remains a crucial research topic how such a voluntary agreement could be 
established and how regional incentives to participate in the agreement would change according to different 
forms and designs of the agreement. This paper provides an overview of recent analysis on ICAs with game-
theoretic approach and of some fl exible mechanism suggested to induce participation in ICAs, especially fo-
cusing on the cost-benefi t analysis using the non-cooperative games to analyze the success of ICAs.
2. Game-theoretic approaches
Game-theoretic approaches have been widely used to examine an interaction between countries in the 
negotiation on climate change, and have emphasised diffi culties in designing such a voluntary agreement. 
This section introduces the basic theoretical framework of the non-cooperative game theory of climate cartel 
coalition formation, which is often used to analyze the success of ICAs. Following this approach, a two-stage 
game of coalition formation is considered. In the fi rst stage, regions decide to join a coalition or not (mem-
bership decision). Regions announcing not to join a coalition, the non-signatories, remain singleton players, 
and those announcing to join, the signatories, form a unique coalition. In the second stage, regions adopt their 
abatement strategies over the planning horizon. The strategies are based on the payoff function which is com-
posed of regional benefi ts from global abatement and cost of abatement. Non-signatories choose their abate-
ment level by maximizing their own payoffs, taking the other regions’ abatement levels as given. On the other 
hand, signatories choose the abatement levels that maximize the sum of the payoffs of the signatories (joint 
welfare maximization), taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. In this setting, all regions de-
cide simultaneously in both stages.
A coalition is stable if the coalition satisfi es both internal and external stability: cf. d’Aspremont et al. (1983). 
Internal stability of a coalition requires that no signatories have an incentive to withdraw from the coalition as 
 2) For the theory of public goods, see Cornes and Sandler (1996).
??? ???????? ???????
a lower payoff is obtained by changing their strategies to not join the coalition. Similarly, external stability of 
a coalition means an equilibrium where no non-signatories have an incentive to participate in the coalition as 
a lower payoff is achieved by changing their strategies to join a coalition. In a defi nition of external stability, 
it is implicitly assumed that non-signatories can join the coalition freely whenever they can obtain the higher 
payoffs by joining the coalition, without the approval of other signatories. This is called an open membership 
which is in line with the procedures of the Kyoto Protocol.
A number of studies on ICAs have investigated the formation of climate coalitions in a theoretical frame-
work with symmetric or asymmetric countries (e.g.? Hoel, 1992; Barrett, 1994, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1993; Hoel and Schneider, 1997). These studies show that self-enforcing ICAs can be successful only when 
the difference between the non-cooperative outcome and the full-cooperative outcome is suffi ciently small. 
The studies with asymmetric countries reveal that it is hard to achieve self-enforcing agreements with a large 
number of signatories because of asymmetries among countries in the context of benefits and costs from 
abatement (Carraro, 1999). Other studies, such as Fankhauser and Kverndokk (1996), Tol (2001) and Finus et 
al. (2006) derive similar results from game-theoretic models with stylized integrated assessment model. There 
are substantially larger global net benefi ts achieved in the full-cooperative case than in the non-cooperative 
case, but some countries are worse off because they contribute more to reduce emissions than is in their own 
interest. This will eventually lead to free-riding. Given the fact that each region’s net benefi ts derived from 
abatement depend heavily on the arrangements enacted by the ICAs and the design of mechanisms, ICAs 
should be individually rational (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus, 2002) for participants in the agreement, 
i.e., each member of an ICA is at least as well off as in the non-cooperative case. 
3. Flexible mechanism to promote participation
This section reviews the role of some fl exible mechanisms, namely transfer schemes and issue linkages, 
which may promote participation in the ICAs. 
3.1 Transfer scheme
To lower the free-riding incentives, some of the policy regimes apply the concept of transfer schemes be-
tween countries in the form of side payments, emission permit trading or surplus sharing (e.g., Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1993; Edmonds et al., 1995; Rose et al., 1998; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006; Weikard et 
al., 2006). Transfer schemes are especially suitable to compensate regions that contribute relatively more 
to abatement in the coalition, but that have relatively low benefi ts from abatement. Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1993) conclude in an analytical framework that transfer schemes may successfully increase the number of 
signatories. In a model with fi ve asymmetric regions, Botteon and Carraro (1997) confi rm the results obtained 
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by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) that ICAs can consist of at most three countries, and conclude that transfer 
schemes exist that may succeed in stabilizing larger coalitions. Tol (2001) empirically investigates the impact 
of side payments and suggests that with side payments, the largest stable coalitions do not include either the 
large emitters or the most vulnerable countries from climate change. 
In the literature on coalition formation it has been shown that transfer schemes will be effective when 
regions have different structures of costs and benefi ts of abatement, and the design of the transfer schemes 
will highly affect the incentives to join the agreement. Both cost-effectiveness and equity issues have been 
treated as focal points when abatement burdens are distributed among regions. Rose et al. (1998) investigate 
the impacts of rules for allocating emission permits on the abatement costs of achieving the targeted emis-
sion level. They categorize transfer schemes into two types: (i) allocation-based rules and (ii) outcome-based 
rules. In allocation-based rules, emission permits are initially distributed to the coalition members according 
to certain criteria. In outcome-based rules, on the other hand, net benefi ts from cooperative abatement efforts 
are distributed to the coalition members based on certain criteria. For allocation-based rules, such as permit 
trading, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) examine the impact of different allocation schemes on the 
success of ICAs, focusing on what they call ‘pragmatic schemes’ and ‘equitable schemes’. In the pragmatic 
schemes, emission permits are allocated based on certain baseline emission levels, either in the form of Busi-
ness as Usual (BAU) emissions or emissions in the absence of cooperation (Nash equilibrium)? 3) In the equi-
table schemes, emission permits are allocated by considering equity aspects, such as ability to pay for abate-
ments, historical responsibility for accumulated emissions, and the level of technology. They conclude that 
pragmatic schemes perform better than equitable ones in terms of the success of self-enforcing agreements. 
For outcome-based rules, Weikard et al. (2006) explore the impact of surplus sharing rules where net benefi ts 
from cooperating are distributed to the coalition members either on an equitable basis or on an emission basis. 
They fi nd that equitable sharing rules are inferior to emission-based sharing rules in terms of global net ben-
efi ts of controlling climate change. 
The fi ndings of previous studies, have established that the success of ICAs with transfer schemes largely 
depends on how emission permits or net benefi ts are allocated among coalition members. To improve the 
design of transfer further, another type of transfer scheme called ‘optimal sharing’ has been explored. Optimal 
sharing, suggested by Carraro et al. (2006), McGinty (2007), Weikard (2009) and Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 
(2010), offers two main advantages. These are: (i) if the coalition payoff is suffi ciently large and distributed 
in such a way that each member obtains at least its outside-option payoff, no incentives to leave a given 
coalition remain and (ii) all coalitions that are possibly internally stable under some sharing rule are internally 
stabilized. By taking a systematic approach to examine the role of transfer schemes, Carraro et al. (2006) 
 3) Under a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario, no additional climate policy or measure is taken for each region to abate emissions, while in a 
Nash equilibrium, each region chooses the best abatement strategy domestically, taking abatement in other countries as given.
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attests that an ‘appropriate’ transfer scheme (optimal transfer scheme) can maximize cooperation on abate-
ment. Furthermore, Nagashima et al. (2009) provide a comparison of different transfer schemes and relate 
these to results for an optimal sharing scheme and also conclude that optimal sharing rule can stabilize larger 
coalitions.
Another problem concerns the design of transfer schemes that infl uences incentives to cooperate on abate-
ment. As discussed above, a number of studies have explored various fl exible mechanisms to increase the en-
vironmental effectiveness and stimulate cooperation on global abatement. Some of the regimes apply transfer 
schemes to affect burden-sharing for abatement efforts among countries based on criteria such as equity or 
effi ciency. In most of the studies transfer schemes for allocation of abatement burdens are based on a single 
year. In reality, abatement targets for Annex I countries in the Kyoto protocol are assigned according to the 
emission level in 1990. As Germain and Steenberghe (2003) pointed out, a grandfathering rule based on the 
emission level in 1990 does not always satisfy the individual rationality requirement along the time path. The 
static schemes do not take into account that the future growth paths of emissions are expected to diverge sub-
stantially between regions. This leads to assignments where historically large emitters obtain a relatively large 
share of the permits or surplus, while fast-growing developing countries, such as China or India, obtain rela-
tively small shares, resulting in increasing burdens on these developing countries to reduce their emissions; 
an issue brought forward by many developing countries in their argumentation on why they do not agree on 
any reduction targets in the Kyoto protocol. To enhance participation of developing countries, some alterna-
tive allocation schemes are necessary to set incentives to join an agreement especially for those regions whose 
economies are expected to grow faster in the future. This problem can be solved by transfer schemes in which 
the allocation of emission permits generates benefi ts for these developing countries.
A general observation from the literature on the transfer scheme in a coalition formation game is that 
rather ineffi cient partial coalitions tend to emerge and the coalition with all the members may not be attained. 
De Zeeuw (2008) widens the scope to a dynamic context and confi rms that large stable coalitions can only 
emerge when the gains from cooperation are small. Thus, even with transfers, full cooperation on emission 
abatement is hard to establish.
3.2 Issue linkage
Another mechanism, known as issue linkage, that has been proposed may reduce incentives to free-ride 
and expand coalitions in the global warming game. The main idea of issue linkage is that countries negotiate 
not only on emission reductions (public good), but also negotiate on another economic issue which is often 
exclusive to signatories (club good). If the benefi ts from the club good outweigh the incentive to free-ride, 
the incentives to stay in a coalition will increase. Carraro and Siniscalco (1994), Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) 
and Barrett (2003) show that the linkage of the IEAs on climate change control and technological cooperation 
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may stabilize an ICA, as payoffs for signatories will increase due to increased technological spillovers 
from other signatories. Furthermore, Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) show that linkage of the environmental 
agreement with an agreement on technological cooperation may overcome free-riding problems due to the 
fact that the negotiation on both climate change control and technology is more profi table to signatories when 
benefi ts from technological cooperation are exclusive to them than the negotiation on climate control only. In 
their setting, cooperative R&D generates spillovers which infl uence production costs.
Similarly, Kemfert (2004) combines cooperation on abatement and technological innovation to explore the 
possibility of inducing participation from non-cooperative countries, such as the USA. This approach suggests 
that an increase in R&D expenditures will lead to technological innovation through technology spillovers and 
an increase in energy effi ciency through technology spillovers and trade in goods among signatories. 
On the other hand, Nagashima and Dellink (2008) introduce the technological spillovers which infl uence 
marginal abatement costs. They investigate how technology spillovers can infl uence the region’s incentive 
structure to join the coalition, in which technological change through the spillovers is directed to lower 
abatement costs. They show that technology spillovers exclusive to signatories do increase their incentive 
to stay in the coalition and their efforts to reduce emissions, which leads to increased stability. However, as 
the gap between full cooperation and no cooperation also increases with the size of coalitional spillovers, the 
relative success of a coalition, measured in terms of the percentage of the gap between full cooperation and 
no cooperation that is closed by the coalition, mostly decreases with the level of coalitional spillovers. 
As shown in the above empirical literature, the type of spillovers, e.g., whether concerning production costs 
or concerning abatement costs, tends to bring the different implication.
Linking the negotiation on emission reductions to other economic issues, such as technology cooperation 
seems to be in line with reality. Under the UNFCCC framework, the Parties have been negotiating on four key 
issues: emission reductions, adaptation, technology and fi nance, simultaneously. The outcome of negotiation 
on one issue may infl uence the ones on other issues. The issue linkage will describe the real negotiation and 
the analysis of such a multiple negotiation will provide useful implications to policy makers. 
4. Limitation of game theory for the analysis of ICAs
Although the game theoretic approaches are useful to examine interactions between regions in the negotia-
tions on climate change, there are limitations of game theory for the analysis of ICAs. This section presents 
some limitations and extensions Finus (2008) suggested. One of the extensions is to relax the assumption 
of maximizing the ‘material’ payoffs which are based on costs and benefi ts from abatement, and to consider 
non-material payoffs which refl ects the fact that regions’ decisions of participation might be based on their 
reputation or ethical consideration, or which may include the notion of punishment for non-signatories. Gen-
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eral observation from the cost-benefi t analysis in a coalition formation game is that larger coalition provides 
larger global payoffs not only to signatories but also non-signatories due to the public good nature of climate 
change control. For example, Hoel and Schneider (1997) introduce the regional-specifi c ‘non-environmental 
costs’ of breaking the agreement for non-signatories. Their theoretical model fi nds that implementation of the 
non-environmental costs increases the number of participating countries in the case of no transfer schemes 
signifi cantly. In an empirical analysis, as such a region-specifi c non-material payoff is hard to be quantifi ed, 
this will be challenging for modelers to analyze how non-material payoffs affect the success of ICAs.
Another critique is related to the determination of abatement levels within a coalition. The common as-
sumption used in a coalition formation model is to derive abatement within a coalition from joint welfare 
maximization among coalition members. One of the problems with this assumption Finus (2008) pointed out 
is that this does not refl ect abatement level in the observed international negotiation; the coalitional abatement 
is not allocated in a cost-effective way. This critique will be improved if the concept of bargaining theory is 
applied. For example, potential signatories negotiate on a uniform emission abatement level (quota). Although 
the uniform allocation is not necessarily ‘fair’ when considering the regions’ circumstances, this is often ap-
plied in international environmental agreements, such as Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the 
ozone layer? 4)
Furthermore, the reader should be aware that a central assumption in the game-theoretical analysis applied 
in the literature is that regions act on the basis of self-interest. An interesting research question is how ele-
ments of altruistic behavior would affect the outcomes.
5. Concluding Remarks
Global warming is one of the crucial challenges that the world is facing now. The allocation of abatement 
efforts among regions has long been negotiated and it will not be an easy task to achieve a full cooperation 
with stringent targets in an ongoing international negotiation under UNFCCC framework. Game-theoretic 
approaches have been widely used to examine interactions between countries in the negotiations on climate 
change, and have emphasized diffi culties in designing such a voluntary agreement. To curtail the free-riding 
incentive, some of the policy regimes apply the concept of transfer schemes between regions and the issue 
linkage, which highly affects the incentives to join the agreement. Although there are some limitations of 
game theory for the analysis of ICAs, useful policy implication can be derived from these studies and further 
contribution will be expected to improve the current international negotiation on climate change. 
 4) Other examples are shown in Finus (2001).
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